The petitioners challenged the validity of Article 323A of the Constitution, which was added by the 42nd Amendment in 1976. This article excluded the High Courts' jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227 in service-related matters. Additionally, they contested Sections 4, 5, 6, and 28 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. These sections laid out the qualifications and appointment procedures for the Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the Administrative Tribunal.
The case focused on two key issues:
- Whether removing the High Courts’ jurisdiction in service matters (as specified in Section 28 of the Act) and granting exclusive jurisdiction to the Administrative Tribunal, except for the Supreme Court’s jurisdiction under Articles 32 and 136, was constitutionally valid.
- Whether the structure and appointment process for the Tribunal's Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and members created any constitutional issues that could invalidate the provisions of the Act.
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Analysis of the Court
This case is significant as the Supreme Court emphasized the foundational role of judicial review in the Indian Constitution. Referring to the precedent set in Minerva Mills v. Union of India (AIR 1986 SC 2030), the Court affirmed that judicial review is an essential and unalterable feature of the Constitution. The Court explained that removing judicial review entirely would fundamentally alter the character of the Constitution.
The judgment further clarified that if a law enacted under Article 323A(1) excludes the High Court's jurisdiction under Articles 226 and 227, it must establish an effective alternative mechanism for judicial review. Failing to do so would render such a law violative of the Constitution's basic structure and beyond Parliament’s authority to enact.
Additionally, the Court stressed that the independence of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Members of Administrative Tribunals must be safeguarded from executive interference. Without this independence, the Tribunals could not serve as an effective alternative to the High Courts. Consequently, provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 that compromised this independence would be deemed invalid.
However, the Court did not strike down the Act entirely. Instead, it gave the Central Government an opportunity to amend the Act to address the identified issues, ensuring the law aligned with constitutional principles. The judgment was made prospective, providing the government a stipulated time to implement necessary changes.
Conclusion
This case highlighted the essential role of judicial review as a fundamental feature of the Indian Constitution, affirming that any attempt to curtail it would compromise the Constitution’s basic structure. While the Court acknowledged the potential of Administrative Tribunals as alternative mechanisms for dispute resolution, it stressed the need for their independence from executive influence. The judgment, while prospective, provided an opportunity for the Central Government to rectify the identified constitutional deficiencies in the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985. Although this decision laid the groundwork for reforms in alternative adjudication frameworks, its significance was later curtailed when overruled by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (AIR 1997 SC 1125).