Bench of Justice KV Viswanathan and Justice SVN Bhatti

Introduction

The Supreme Court of India, in its judgment ruled that the mere mention of Section 307 IPC (Now Sec 109 of BNS, 2023) (attempt to murder) in a FIR does not prevent the High Court from quashing criminal proceedings based on a settlement if the facts do not substantiate the charge. The Court emphasized that the nature of the injury, weapon used, conduct of the accused, and societal impact must be considered before refusing to quash a case on the ground of settlement.

Facts of the Case

A FIR was registered in 1991 against the appellants, including charges under Section 307 IPC (attempt to murder). The primary allegation involved a firearm injury, but the specific act of firing was attributed to one accused, who had since passed away. The injuries sustained by the victim were not life-threatening (a fracture of the left ring finger). The case remained pending for decades, and in the meantime, the parties had reached an amicable settlement. The Allahabad High Court refused to quash the criminal proceedings despite the compromise. The appellants approached the Supreme Court, arguing that continuing the case would be futile.

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Issues

• Whether a FIR mentioning Section 307 IPC (Now Sec 109 of BNS, 2023) (a non-compoundable offence) prevents the quashing of proceedings if the charge is not supported by facts.
• Whether the nature of injuries and weapon used justified the application of Section 307 IPC.
• Whether a settlement between parties can be a valid ground for quashing a non-compoundable offence.

Contentions of the Petitioners

The High Court erred in confusing compounding of an offence with quashing of criminal proceedings. The allegations were vague, and the main accused (who allegedly fired the shot) had died. The injury suffered was minor, and there was no intent to cause death, making Section 307 IPC inapplicable. Citing Gian Singh v. State of Punjab (2012) 10 SCC 303, they argued that a compromise could be a valid reason for quashing the case. Since the dispute was settled, continuing the trial would be an abuse of process.

Contentions of the Respondents

Section 307 IPC is a serious offence, and such cases should not be quashed merely on the basis of a settlement. The prosecution had collected evidence supporting the framing of charges. The impact on society must be considered before quashing cases involving heinous offences. Relying on Narinder Singh v. State of Punjab (2014) 6 SCC 466, they argued that attempt to murder cases generally cannot be quashed on settlement.

Court’s Analysis

Distinction between Quashing and Compounding:

The Court reiterated that quashing of proceedings under Article 226 or Section 482 CrPC (Now Sec 528 of BNSS,2023) is different from compounding under Section 320 CrPC (Now Sec 359 of BNSS,2023). Even though Section 307 IPC is non-compoundable, the High Court can still quash proceedings if the facts do not justify the charge.

The Court relied on Gian Singh (2012), Laxmi Narayan (2019), and Narinder Singh (2014) to affirm that in certain cases, even serious offences can be quashed based on settlement. The primary accused (who allegedly fired the weapon) had died. The injuries were not serious or life-threatening. The weapon used did not indicate an intent to kill. The compromise was genuine, and there was no significant impact on society in letting the case be quashed. The Court held that proceeding with the trial would be an abuse of process and quashed the criminal proceedings.

Conclusion

The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and quashed the criminal proceedings against the appellants. This judgment states the principle that a mere mention of Section 307 IPC in a FIR does not automatically prevent the quashing of proceedings if the facts do not substantiate the charge and the parties have reached a genuine compromise.